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Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this research is to an nd approaches of the only 
three foreign born holders of the positions of National Security Advisor and Secretary 
of State.  I intend to consider the roles of these three individuals who were born 
ere all 
rced to leave their homeland and flee an oppressive regime with their families.  My 
ething 
ifferent to the way they approached their responsibilities as elite foreign 
olicymakers. It is my contention that these three individuals are set apart from others 
d M deleine Albr only people to 
ave attained one or other of the two most powerful positions the foreign born 
positions gave them a level of influence second only to the president and analysis of 
them is important because, as psychologist Bjorn Christiansen pointed out in 1959, 
not only do they retain the prerogative of m king decisions on behalf of the nation as 
a whole, they also have the power to transl . 
(Christiansen 1959: 18) Some foreign polic  scholars like Byman and Pollack, have 
concluded that rational responses are often affected when leaders perceive 
connections, consciously or subconsciously, between their own personal experiences 
and the affairs of state and consequently it  my contention that the consideration of 
attitudes and approaches of these foreign policy elites is a critical factor in foreign 
alyse the personalities a
outside America, to non-American parents and but also, significantly, who w
fo
aim is to try and discover whether these unique backgrounds contributed som
d
p
because of the fact that war and turmoil meant something personal to them. 
 
Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski an a ight are the 
h
individual can reach in the world of US for ign policy.  The privilege of their e
a
ate their preferences into action
y
is
 3
policy analysis.  As Henry Kissing s a professor I tended to think of 
istory as run by impersonal forces.  But when you see it in practice, you see the 
ifference personalities make.’  (Byman 2001: 108)  
n 
 
36) 
right is 
at they were all born to non-American families, who experienced living under, and 
e age 
irstly, 
s 
eir 
 
er himself said ‘A
h
d
  
Much political science analysis has concentrated on the state’s role, the bureaucracy’ 
role or the institutional system’s role in forming foreign policy but it is my opinio
that the part the individual plays is at least equally important.  Furthermore the 
question that Lloyd Etheredge emphasises and the one which I would suggest needs to
be addressed is ‘whether certain personality traits, in certain situations….actually 
have tipped the balance for or against a policy choice.’ (Etheredge 1978: 4
 
The significant factor, in my view, that unites Kissinger, Brzezinski and Alb
th
fleeing from, an oppressive regime.  There was in fact a fourth foreign-born Secretary 
of State, Christian Herter who was born in Paris in 1895 and lived there until th
of 9 but there are two reasons why he has not been included in this research.  F
he was born to American parents who were living in Paris temporarily and secondly 
he and his family were not forced to leave France against their will.  For these reason
I have considered him to be of American birth but temporarily re-located.  It is the 
nature of policymakers’ childhood influences that is of interest to me, not th
specific physical location at the time of their birth. 
 
What I am looking to discover is whether my three subjects showed similar 
approaches in their foreign policy work that could feasibly be attributed to their 
exceptional backgrounds (exceptional in the world of elite US foreign policy maker
 4
that is).  The point of this piece of research is to try and ascertain whether the 
formative experiences of these three subjects can be shown to be the independent 
variable on which certain policy outcomes can be attributed. 
cy 
 
little 
ork which has concentrated specifically on émigré policymakers and this is an 
s an 
er, believing that the NSA is the 
ost important appointment in a president’s team both because of the responsibilities 
nfluence 
 
h 
 
There has been some work done on the area of cognition by scholars on the effects of 
childhood background on the personalities and decision making of elite foreign poli
makers.  Lloyd Etheredge, for example, in A World of Men looked at the role of
personality and values in the foreign policy approaches of elite policy makers and 
Fred Greenstein considered the effects of personality on politics in his book 
Personality and Politics to name but two.  However, there seems to have been 
w
attempt to cover this neglected area.  I would suggest that part of the explanation for 
this omission is due to the fact that much of the research on personality that has been 
done in this area has concentrated on the president where, of course, the émigré factor 
is irrelevant - as we all know, the Constitution demands the president be American 
born. 
 
I should explain why I have chosen the holders of two foreign policy positions rather 
than concentrating on the apparently higher profile position of Secretary of State.   
Although the Secretary of State may be more visible, the NSA undoubtedly play
equally important role.  Jerel Rosati goes even furth
m
he undertakes in the overall co-ordination of foreign policy and his level of i
as an advisor.  (Rosati 2004: 113)  It was Kissinger in particular who was mostly
responsible for bringing the NSA role into ascendancy and it has remained at this hig
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level of influence ever since.  Gerry Andrianopoulos described the role of NSA
it was occupied by both Kissinger and Brzezinski as ‘architect, advocate and 
orchestrator of policy’ and ‘an extension’ of the president.  Th
, when 
ese attributes make the 
SA a very important and central figure in US foreign policy (Andrianopolous 1991: 
ion 
, 
l 
e 
ed their actions throughout their careers.  Examples of the more helpful works 
clude Walter Isaacson’s biography Kissinger; Kissinger: the European Mind in 
.  
N
1-3) and therefore I have chosen to consider the holders of this position alongside the 
Secretary of State because I consider them equally influential.  
 
In this thesis I intend to consider how the effects of background are revealed in the 
individual policy makers’ approaches through some of the methods of cognit
theory.  By considering the wealth of information that has been produced in the field
I hope it will help to explain the extent of the effects that background and persona
experience have on personality and decision making.   
 
When it comes to considering each of the three subjects individually, I have tried to 
look at them from two angles.  Firstly I have used some of the many works that hav
analys
in
American Politics by Bruce Mazlish; Gerry Andrianopoulos’s Kissinger and 
Brzezinski and Thomas Lippman’s Madeleine Albright and the New American 
Diplomacy.  There are many others which have added illumination and insight into 
the way these people have approached their roles.  Secondly I have used some 
primary sources such as autobiographies and interviews in an effort to understand 
what the subjects themselves believe to have been their influences and also to find 
examples of incidents that have been dealt with in ways which betray their beliefs
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Although there have been many books written about these three policymakers 
separately, most have looked at their contributions to foreign policy in their en
am not aware of any works that have looked at the common element of émigré status 
specifically and it is my hope that this piece of research will reveal some reasons why 
it is worthwhile exercise to attempt to fill this gap. 
 
tirety.  I 
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Cognition Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
Analysis of the cognitive processes at work in foreign policy decision making is an 
portant exercise simply because, as Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack put it, ‘the 
oals, abilities and foibles of individuals are crucial to the intentions, capabilities, and 
trategies of a state’. (Byman 2001: 109) As far back as the early 20th century, the 
levance of studying the background of policymakers was enunciated by Walter 
Lippman when he wrote that any consideration of politics that failed to take into 
account the effects of the personalities involved was ‘just the deepest error in our 
political thinking.’ (Greenstein 1969: 6)  
 
Despite Lippman’s warning, Lloyd Etheredge came to the conclusion in his 1978 
book, A World of Men, that traditionally the majority of scholars have simply accepted 
that individual personality characteristics have had little or no influence over 
American foreign policy.  Etheredge’s objection to this state of affairs was that this 
acceptance had not been thoroughly tested, his criticism with these studies being that 
they had been insufficiently rigorous in eliminating other explanatory variables such 
as personality thereby in his view, making the results inconclusive.  His own 
conclusion, when he looked at several studies together, was that the behaviour that 
individuals showed when dealing with international relations tended to be a 
magnification of the traits that were found in their personal lives. (Etheredge 1978: 
435-436)  
 
im
g
s
re
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During the 1960s, Ole Holsti wa al scientists who agreed that 
the effects of cognition were paramount.  It as his argument that the personal, most 
entral beliefs of policymakers led them, for example, to maintain ‘rigid images’ of 
d thus would affect the decisions they made regarding those states.  
te 
 his work on the subject of perceptions, the 
tudy encounters the difficulty of getting ‘inside the head of our subject.’  But for 
d 
hand 
elps 
 
 is, to put it simply, a summation of the complicated processes that 
ontribute to a final decision, and therefore policy outcome.   
s one of the few politic
 w
c
other states an
(Holsti 1962: 250)  Steve Yetiv was another who later argued that to use only 
government level factors in foreign policy analysis and neglect to consider how the 
personal experiences of the individuals involved affect the process ‘misses important 
parts of the picture’. (Yetiv 2004: 59) 
 
Perhaps one of the major reasons that cognition has been neglected in the serious 
study of foreign policy making has been down to the difficulty of obtaining accura
data.  As Richard Herrman commented in
s
Hermann this argument was irrelevant as in his opinion, evidence could be ‘inferre
from observable consequences’ and, if done carefully, the perceptions of individuals 
could be effectively measured.  (Herrman 1988: 180-181)  
 
Personality 
In his book Personality and Politics Fred Greenstein simplified the references of 
cognition and its effects by using the concept and term ‘personality’ as a short
explanation for the collection of all the factors that contribute to policymaking 
decisions. (Greenstein 1969: 1)  By using this term as a basis for analysis, it h
encapsulate all that is discovered when considering the effects of cognitive activity. 
Personality
c
 9
 Individual behaviour is in essence a product of individual personality combined with 
of the surrounding context.  For Ralph Linton, the interaction of the individual with 
the ‘human environment’ produces responses which are never fixed but always 
remain individual. (Linton 1998: 86)  But Bruce Mazlish defined the formation
personality in more detail by writing ‘a person is a complex inter-relation of such 
factors as genetic inheritance, generational experience, particular family upbringing, 
and specific life experiences.’ (Mazlish
 of 
 1975: 17) 
 
  
and 
 
ychologist Erik Erikson 
roduced the conclusion that ‘in considering an individual’s relationship with his 
hould focus on the years of adolescence during which time the individual 
kan 
f 
  
, and 
n this theory of 
 
People acquire their values and attitudes from the society to which they belong and
that society develops these parameters for the good of the society as a whole. (Linton 
1998: 74)  It is inevitable that different societies have different value-attitude systems.
Although all of this work’s subjects left their homelands during early adolescence 
so would likely not have had their personal value systems fully developed, it is fair to
say, I think, that they would certainly have begun to build the framework that would 
stay with them through life.  Indeed, work carried out by ps
p
society, we s
expands his horizon from family and neighbours to a wider social existence.’ (Vol
1997: 6) 
 
Thomas Lippman as we have learned was one analyst who considered the effects o
cognition and personality to be a hugely important aspect of policy outcome analysis.
Lippmann’s theory had as its foundation the conviction that ‘we do not first see
then define, we define first and then see.’  Jerel Rosati has take
 10
Lippman as the basis for his own study in which he concluded that human beings use 
 
t he terms ‘cognitive misers’, a 
ference to the fact that there is a limit to how much information can be processed by 
t 
once they are formed.  Once in existence these beliefs become something 
gainst which new information is measured and compared.  The particularly 
te 
this mechanism of maintaining already formed definitions in order to process the new
information that is constantly received and which would otherwise overload them.  
This is necessary, Rosati argues because, in the words of political scientist John 
Steinbruner ‘the mind of man, for all its marvels, is a limited instrument’. (Rosati 
2004: 280) 
 
It is Rosati’s contention that human beings are wha
re
the mind.  In order to reduce the load and simplify complex decisions, people almos
always use cognitive shortcuts which are derived from patterns of belief already in 
existence. (Rosati 2004: 282)  The ‘cognitive miser’ theory accepts that it is feasible 
for beliefs to change over time but it relies in essence on the fact that a stable, or 
relatively stable, central set of beliefs exist and that decision makers need to refer to 
them each time a decision is made. (Rosati 2000: 57)  Without this process, the 
complexity of decision making would be overwhelming.   
 
Many theorists have come to the verdict that cognitive consistency is the norm for 
human beings and that individuals are extremely reluctant to discard their central set 
of beliefs 
a
significant thing about this process is that when new information is received, if it 
conforms to the existing belief pattern it will probably be retained but if does not 
conform, it is more likely to be ignored.  Thus beliefs formed early on, formed long 
before decisionmakers take up their positions of responsibility, have an inordina
 11
influence on their actions whilst performing their later duties.  Thus, in the context of 
international relations, no matter how much other state actors might modify their 
behaviour, it is likely, though it must be emphasised not certain, that the initial belie
the decisionmaker holds about that state actor will not be altered. (Immerman 200
116-117)   
 
f 
4: 
elief Systems 
b 
by 
 
oes too far to say that these 
ttitudes never changed but it is widely accepted by many specialists that significant 
 partly 
 to 
e 
B
Hence, in order to understand an individual’s decision making process, these 
underlying key beliefs must be revealed first.  The discovery of these is possible 
because, as Rosati argues, beliefs are not random but are formed by coherent, 
consistent systems.  Separate studies made during the twentieth century by Newcom
and by Holsti revealed that the political attitudes of both elites and non-elites 
remained intact over their lifetimes and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that 
looking at the attitudes of Kissinger, Brzezinski and Albright at earlier times in their 
lives, we can make the assumption that, at least to some extent, they would have
remained broadly in the same position whilst in office.  It g
a
change would be unlikely. (Rosati 1987: 22-24) 
 
Although this pattern of beliefs is highly influential, it is Robert Jervis’s contention 
that they do not necessarily accurately reflect reality. (Jervis 1976: 3)  This is
because according to Jervis, the firsthand experience of an event, either through 
seeing or participating in it personally leaves impressions that are disproportionate
the event’s significance.  Thus, these experiences are especially important because, h
believes, people ‘learn too much from what happens to themselves.’  The example 
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Jervis uses to illustrate his point is of diplomats seeing the effects of revolution in 
their country in which they are serving.  He explains that the diplomat who sees 
reform lead to Communism will end up being more suspicious than the one who sees 
democracy emerge.  The excessive suspicion will remain in spite of his close 
knowledge of the other’s different experience (Jervis 1976: 239-240) This example 
ads me to conclude that this could just as appropriately be applied to those who saw 
ir own country.   
r 
he 
o often, 
t 
 
217-
longside their own specifically individual experiences, policymakers are also 
g 
n 
d 
le
it happen in the
 
By looking at historical international situations, whether personally experienced o
not, policymakers try to discern patterns because the assumption is made that t
future will always look like the past. But Robert Jervis points out there are dangers in 
this when there is a reliance on perceptions of the past that are too narrow.  To
failure to acknowledge that differences in circumstance exist between past and presen
results in, to use Jervis’s phrase ‘the tyranny of the past upon the imagination’ and he
warns of the pitfalls of having ‘overlearned from traumatic events.’ (Jervis 1976: 
218) 
 
Nationalism 
A
products of the social and cultural conditions of the society from which they come.  
When a policymaker is appointed, they join an existing government institution, takin
up membership of it with its rules and preferences but at the same time they retai
membership of their larger social system.  In this way they remain, as Snyder, Bruck 
and Sapin call them, ‘culture bearers’ and the patterns from their culture have a 
bearing on the decisions they make.  When Kissinger, Brzezinski and Albright joine
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their governments they were culture bearers not only of their American home but a
brought with them the additional cultural patterns of their place of birth too.  (Sny
1962: 156) 
 
Richard Herrman wrote ‘in a world of international relations the self is likely to be 
closely tied to the community to which the subject gives his or her ultimate loyalty, 
most likely the nation’ (Herrman 
lso 
der 
1988: 183) and this is where Kissinger, Brzezinski 
nd Albright are set apart from other NSAs or Secretaries of State.  Whilst not 
 to 
eign birth with regard to the development of foreign policy.  He said that it is 
possible to really know your own culture without having knowledge of other 
ton 1998: 84)  Therefore, the question arises whether it is feasible to 
me to 
 is 
a
suggesting that their loyalty was compromised – clearly, in order for them to have 
attained the positions they did, they must have shown fierce loyalty and patriotism
the US – it does not require a very big leap of imagination to suspect that an element 
of their loyalty may rest with the country of their birth, particularly when they have 
been forced to leave it involuntarily.    
 
One of Ralph Linton’s observations gives another, perhaps even advantageous feature 
of for
im
cultures.  (Lin
suggest that those in government who began life in a different culture actually ca
know their adoptive culture better than indigenous participants.  Perhaps it can be 
argued that, ultimately our three subjects were in a better position than their American 
born colleagues to direct the nation’s policies toward other nations.  However, there
a limit to what can be taken from these particular cases as all three came from 
European cultures, cultures which America, in essence, shares it roots. 
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Conclusion 
The message that advocates of cognition theory are trying to transmit is well put by 
Richard Immerman who wrote that ‘interpretation of information, the grist for the 
olicymaking mill, does not occur in a contextual vacuum.’ (Immerman 2004: 106)  
by 
cision 
s 
deration in the analytical processing, it should 
e acknowledged that the overall effect is mitigated by the fact that multiple 
d 
 
 
p
Context will always control outcome and the backgrounds and experiences brought 
the participants of the decision making process contribute to that context.  
 
Individual personalities produce the environment through which each policy de
is measured against and to ignore the effects of these when applying analysis mean
that not all elements are taken into consideration and consequently a robust 
conclusion is not achieved.  However it must be remembered that a policy decision is 
rarely taken by one individual in isolation.  Although the influence of individual 
personalities must be included for consi
b
personalities and cognitive processes are working simultaneously and all are 
contributing to the final outcome.  These, along with impersonal factors such as rigi
bureaucratic forces and the effects of such concepts as ‘groupthink’ mean that, in
order to produce a satisfactory reading of policy development, many effects have to
be considered in parallel.    
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Henry Kissinger 
s a unique 
oment as he became the first person to achieve the highest political position open to 
s 
 
ttributed 
licy 
e 
ouse that in 1974, Time magazine wrote of him that he 
as ‘quite possibly….the world’s most indispensable man.’ (Mazlish 1975: 5)   
hen considering the question of how much of an influence the events of his 
childhood had over his career and his policies, if one were to rely solely on 
Kissinger’s own answers, this would be a very short chapter.  Time and again, he has 
denied any influence, refuting the idea that those dreadful events in any way affected 
 
 
Introduction 
Henry Kissinger has been one of the most fascinating and central figures in modern 
American foreign policy.  His appointment as Secretary of State in 1973 wa
m
someone of foreign birth.  As President Nixon’s National Security Advisor, then later 
his Secretary of State, Kissinger was responsible for some of the most radical policie
of the Cold War period.  Working closely with Nixon, Kissinger was largely
responsible for the execution of the detente policies with China and the Soviet Union 
and introduced ideas of ‘linkage’ and the ‘back channel’ methods.   
 
The increasing importance of the National Security Advisor role can also be a
to Kissinger as he manoeuvred to make it central to Nixon’s entire foreign po
organisation.  His influence has rarely been matched and he became, to quote Jerel 
Rosati ‘the president’s manager, major advisor, spokesman and, in some cases, 
implementer of foreign policy’. (Rosati 2004: 121)  Such was his influence during th
time he spent in the White H
w
 
W
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the decisions he made whether a ational Security Advisor or any 
f the other positions he held.  He once claimed in an early interview that he had no 
sting impression of the time of his growing up, later adding ‘that part of my 
ot a key to anything’ and claimed not to have been particularly aware of 
at at an 
 
ed 
s 
arty’ 
 
ry have 
owing up 
s Secretary of State, N
o
la
childhood is n
the events which took place around him.  (Isaacson 1992: 26)  
 
Yet, despite his public denials, Kissinger in fact did make some references to how his 
background impinged on his policy approach, one of the most significant instances 
being during the ceremony following his swearing in as Secretary of State, when he 
said ‘If my origin can contribute anything to the formulation of policy, it is th
early age I have seen what can happen to a society that is based on hatred and strength
and distrust.’  (Isaacson 1992: 506) 
 
Childhood 
Henry Kissinger was born in the Bavarian town of Fürth to Jewish parents and nam
Heinz Alfred Kissinger, only becoming ‘Henry’ upon his move to America.  Fürth i
situated just outside Nuremberg, a town described as ‘a stronghold of the Nazi p
during the interwar period.  Those early manifestations of Nazism would, in Ralph 
Blumenfeld’s view, ‘permeate Kissinger’s childhood and, at some level, program the
rest of his life.’  (Blumenfeld 1974: 2)   
 
In contrast to Kissinger’s own denials, many who grew up with the young Hen
spoken of the impossibility of remaining unaffected by the experiences of gr
as a Jew under Nazism.  As a childhood friend once said ‘you can’t grow up like we 
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did and be untouched’ although he did go on to add ‘but Kissinger has to forget some 
of it if he is Secretary of State. (Blumenfeld 1974: 25) 
 
Another who knew Kissinger well as a young man was an army officer called Fritz 
Kraemer.  Kraemer had also fled Europe because of the Nazis and eventually became 
rivate Kissinger’s mentor.  He agreed that it was impossible for Kissinger to have 
 
hildhood had no effect on him, but the reality 
as that he did accept there were influences. During the making of a TV documentary 
dged that having lived under totalitarianism himself, he understood what 
 
h 
in the Germany they loved.  They emigrated to America when Henry was aged 15, 
P
been unaffected by his experiences.  ‘For five years, the most formative years (10 to 
15), Henry had to undergo this horror’ he said (Blumenfeld 1974: 6) and inevitably,
although Kissinger was strong ‘the Nazis were able to damage his soul’. (Isaacson 
1992: 29)  
 
Kissinger proclaimed often that his c
w
he acknowle
it meant and the personal experience of oppression undoubtedly contributed to what 
became his core of central beliefs.  In a letter written shortly after the war, Kissinger 
revealed that one fundamental belief informed his thinking – survival was everything. 
He formed the conclusion that during the holocaust ‘weakness was synonymous wit
death’ and these early thoughts defined his position throughout his life. (Isaacson 
1992: 761)   
 
America 
As the situation became dangerous for Jews in Fürth and normal life gradually 
became more curtailed, the Kissinger family decided that they no longer had a future 
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moving into an area of New York where many others from their region of Germany 
had already settled.  (Isaacson 1992: 28-29)  
 
As a newly immigrant teenager, Henry was keen to assimilate, enrolling in High 
School and learning about baseball but curiously he never lost his heavy accent 
(Mazlish 1975: 37-40)  The transformation of immigrant to American took place in 
the army.  Not only officially – he was naturalised upon joining in 1943 – but 
psychologically too.  He served in Europe and commented later that these army dutie
‘made me feel like an American.’ (Isaacson 1992: 40)  
 
s 
ervently patriotic toward his adopted country, Kissinger clearly never forgot his 
 
to American once he physically made the immigrant journey.  Hugo 
ppenheim, a fellow Jew from Fürth who saw Kissinger grow up was sure it was 
plicated than this.  As he explained to Ralph Blumenfeld, ‘Kissinger says 
. 
F
immigrant beginnings - something that was illustrated in an incident that occurred 
soon after the end of the Vietnam War in 1972.  When a stranger came up to him, 
asking to shake his hand, Kissinger reacted humbly, remarking to his companion 
‘Where else could it happen but in a country like this?  To let a foreigner make peace
for them, to accept a man like me – I even have a foreign accent.’ (Isaacson 1992: 
462)  
 
Kissinger’s psychological identity however, was not simply transformed from 
German Jew 
O
more com
simply that ‘I am an American’ but I don’t believe him.  He is also a European’
(Blumenfeld 1974: 29) To someone who had made the same journey, the European 
identity was not something that could be discarded.   
 19
 Simply being a European set Kissinger apart from most of his colleagues.  Bruce 
azlish described Kissinger’s contribution to politics as the ‘Europeanization of 
 
n.  
 
reagh 
elf American, the typically 
ealistic characteristic that America was built on was not to be found in Kissinger.  
 
e 
gh Kissinger has become renowned for his seemingly emotion free realpolitick 
pproach, Bruch Mazlish nevertheless contends that he did have an unusual ability to 
r’s 
the 
tion 
 
 
M
American foreign policy.’ (Mazlish 1975: vii)  This effect of European history on
Kissinger’s politics was demonstrated in his first significant scholarly contributio
Based on his doctoral thesis, his book A World Restored betrayed what was to be his
lifelong fascination with the 19th century European statesmen Bismarck, Castle
and Metternich.  (Isaacson 1992: 77) Perhaps these European roots and historical 
influences explained how, although he considered hims
id
He was not a crusader but an ardent advocate of the realist school - a disciple of, in
Isaacson’s words ‘its Prussian-accented cousin realpolitick.’  The important 
international status attained through power governed Kissinger’s philosophy, not th
idealism traditionally found in American politicians. (Isaacson 1992: 653) 
 
Realism versus ideology 
Althou
a
put himself in other people’s shoes.  This quality showed itself during Kissinge
army experiences when he was involved in helping to rebuild German towns once 
war had ended.  Despite being in a position of some power he showed a determina
to never humiliate the defeated Germans in retribution for the treatment of the Jews. 
(Mazlish 1975: 45) Moreover he held the most contempt for those who sought 
vengeance insisting that it was unpardonable for those who knew how it felt to abuse
others.  (Isaacson 1992: 53)   
 20
 However, despite showing an ability to empathise, Kissinger was essentially cynic
about the role of ‘goodness’ in foreign relations.  It was his belief that success in 
world affairs ultimately came down to power and it is entirely feasible, Mazlish for 
one says, that this emanates directly from his experiences under the Nazis.  
Essentially, it is Mazlish’s argument that he had held his father in the image of 
goodness, yet had seen that even he had been unable to protect himself against 
Nazism; he had been forced to flee his homeland.  This tragic event brought Kissin
to the simple conclusion that it wasn’t goodness that mattered in the world but pow
(Mazlish 1975: 163)   
 
Stability and order were the most important things in the world to Kissinger a
power and strength were the things that ensured this. (Blumenfeld 1974: 2) He was a 
firm believer in balance of power politics, explaining in his memoir The Wh
al 
ger 
er.  
nd 
ite House 
ears how political influence was directly linked to military power.  Diplomacy 
s purely a side player to military capacity.  (Kissinger 1979: 
ar 
argued that the ‘irrational, chaotic experience of 
Y
smoothed the way but wa
195)  His definition of peace was the achievement of stability through the 
‘equilibrium of forces’. (Andrianopoulos 1991: 14) 
 
David Landau’s analysis of Kissinger’s writings brought him to the basic conclusion 
that international stability became his aim because revolution and upheaval were his 
fears. (Landau 1972: 15)  Walter Isaacson agreed, contending that these conclusions 
were a direct result of his experiences as a Jew and as a German under the Weim
Republic, where societal breakdown allowed the growth of a totalitarian regime.  
(Isaacson 1992: 761)  Landau 
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Kissinger’s early life’ produced his most foundational belief that order and stability 
logical 
oulos 
  His reasoning behind his belief was this.   
(Kissinger 1964: 2)   
 
n a 
were paramount.  (Landau 1972: 16)  The collapse of state systems, such as had 
happened with the Weimar Republic, had to be prevented at any cost.   
 
For Kissinger the greatest threat to stability, and therefore peace, was the 
revolutionary power or, to put it another way, the state that moved through ideo
motive.  The precise type of ideology was, for Kissinger, irrelevant. (Andrianop
1991: 14) The problem as he saw it was that these states could never be assured of 
security from opposing ideologies and consequently would always feel required to 
shore up their strength.
 
‘The distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it 
feels threatened – such feeling is inherent in the nature of 
international relations based on sovereign states – but that 
nothing can reassure it – Only absolute security – the 
neutralization of the opponent – is considered a sufficient 
guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security 
means absolute insecurity for all the others.’ 
 
David Landau explained Kissinger’s ‘revulsion of ideology’ as being at the very core 
of his personality quite simply because he had been ‘a victim of the greatest 
ideological holocaust of all time.’ (Landau 1972: 7) 
 
Kissinger came out of the most cataclysmic event of his life by concluding that the
‘survival mentality’ was critical. (Andrianopoulos 1991: 28)  He believed this o
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personal level and on an international level too - his responsibility was to defend 
America as a nation, not as an ideological cause.  Its not that he disregarded value
foreign policy because he disagreed with their existence but rather that w
s in 
ithout 
urvival, values were immaterial. A story he heard from an old friend from Fürth after 
ed between 
to 
ld went wrong, to 
nsure America’s safety. (Isaacson 1992: 52-3)  
 
Nixon A
As had istration’s 
primary Kissinger 
dealt w ince the 
Soviets grounds.   
His me nds, with 
oth the main Communist powers – China as well as the Soviet Union.  He was 
ent with 
a central figure in controlling the 
ternational order.  He maintained that if he could convince the Soviet Union that 
 
. 
s
the war convinced Kissinger once and for all of the tension that often exist
morality and survival.  Helmut Reissner spent much of the war in a concentration 
camp and he explained to Kissinger how survival in the camps had relied on a 
‘disregard for moral standards.  Kissinger was of the opinion that people who had 
lived sheltered lives in the US would never be able to understand this but it was up 
people like him, people who had direct experience of when the wor
e
dministration 
 been the case for all presidents since Word War II, the Nixon Admin
 foreign policy concern was the relationship with the Soviet Union.  
ith this quite differently from his predecessors by attempting to conv
 that the relationship should no longer be pursued along ideological 
thod was to produce positive relationships, on non-ideological grou
b
convinced that international stability could only be assured if all the great powers of 
the world were part of the international dialogue.  By cultivating rapprochem
both countries, Kissinger’s goal was to make the US 
in
China was a serious power it would encourage them to seek a strong, and thus more
stable, relationship with the US and then greater international stability would follow
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(Landau 1972: 104-106) The steps that Kissinger forged were bold and a significa
break with the past.  His innovative way of looking at foreign policy, informed by his 
background, produced a radical style compared with containment policies that h
dominated since the onset of the Cold War.  A moderating of the US-Soviet 
relationship produced negotiations on a level formerly unheard of and the language of 
ideology was replaced by terms of moderation and diplomacy. (Landau 1972: 8) 
 
Kissinger’s realist foreign policy approach was distinct from many other US 
policymakers of the time because of his refusal to believe that America had an 
ideological superiority.  All of his predecessors shared this fundamental conviction 
(Landau 1972: 32) but Kissinger was convinced t
nt 
ad 
hat ‘moral crusaders….made 
angerous statesmen.’  For this reason he was determined never to allow his personal 
e his policy decisions.  He firmly believed that if used his 
 
d
experiences to influenc
position to right the wrongs of personal experience he could never become the 
statesman he wanted to be.  (Isaacson 1992: 653) 
 
Conclusion 
Kissinger’s foreign policy approach was individual and decisive.  It was the approach
of a man who, amongst his immediate peers and predecessors had an individual 
personal experience.  The turbulent childhood that he lived through formulated a 
strategy he considered necessary though radical.  Having experienced the trauma that 
totalitarianism can produce, he made it his responsibility to ensure that it would not be 
repeated.  It was not his aim to right wrongs, but to prevent a repetition of those 
wrongs.  Whilst he held office, he saw it as his responsibility, through the influential 
positions he held in one of the most powerful nations in the world, to make the 
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international arena as safe and secure as possible.  The best way he saw of doing this 
was to seek a balance of power where no country could seek to oppress another 
because of a belief system.   
 
Where it is hard to understand Kissinger’s policy approach is in his lack of interest in 
supporting emerging democracies under authoritarian regimes.  His need for order and 
tability overruled his sympathy for those under oppression yet knowing of his own 
rica to 
ntial 
en the 
iction.  
aced the freedom and opportunity 
at America had allowed him, he rejected the traditional American mindset of 
 the inherent optimism that goes with it.  Despite his loyalty to America, 
ar.   
s
experience of life under these conditions made this difficult for many in Ame
accept.  But it seemed clear to him that any intervention at state level was a pote
threat to the greater imperative of world order.  If he could encourage order and 
stability through his policies, then repression could no longer flourish.  Only wh
power balance existed could oppression really be eradicated.   
 
Nevertheless, it seems to me, that Kissinger himself seems to personify contrad
Whilst he wholeheartedly acknowledged and embr
th
idealism and
he has always appeared to remain distinctly European, at least in part.  Bismarck was 
his influence, not Woodrow Wilson and he has carried with him a distinctly un-
American pessimism that was instilled in him by the personal experience of total w
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Zbigniew Brzezinski  
 
 
Introduction 
Zbigniew Brzezinski was the second foreign-born citizen to hold the position of 
National Security Advisor, serving President Carter between 1977 and 1981.  There 
are some interesting parallels to be seen between Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger 
which perhaps the similarity of an émigré background helps to explain.  During 
Kissinger’s time, Brzezinski had been a very public critic of many policies but despite 
this as well as the fact that they were of opposing parties, Brzezinski openly admitted 
that he did share some views with Kissinger.  Perhaps the most significant similarity 
was that they both believed that instability of the international order was the world’s 
biggest threat. (Andrianopoulos 1991: 43-44) 
 
Inevitably though, the two statesmen also showed sharp differences.  As has been seen 
in the previous chapter, Kissinger rejected the notion of foreign policy based on 
ideology but for Brzezinki, ideology was important.  In his memoirs Power and 
Prinicple, Brzezinski was keen to emphasise what he saw as his contribution to the 
Carter Administration where he called a stronger foreign policy based on morality as 
well as power.  (Brzezinski 1985: 50) He recalled how, immediately after the 1977 
presidential inauguration, he went to his new office and wrote down three broad 
objectives.  The first line began ‘I felt it important to try to increase America’s 
ideological impact on the world.’  In stark contrast to Kissinger, Brzezinski urged a 
stronger, more optimistic American message. (Brzezinski 1985: 3) 
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Childhood 
Although both Brzezinski and Kissinger were both forced to abandon their homelands 
by repressive regimes, Brzezinski’s circum ewhat less dramatic than 
Kissinger’s.  In 1937, Brzezinski’s father took his family with him to Canada whilst 
he served there as Poland’s Consul General.  During his term of duty Poland fell and 
the family found themselves unable to return safely to their homeland.  Consequently 
in 1939, the 11 year old Zbigniew found himself living in Montreal and fiercely 
patriotic towards his country of birth.  He could only watch from afar as his homeland 
ceased to exist, overtaken first by the Germans and then by the Soviet Communists. 
(Wooten 1979: 123-4.)  He followed events in Europe closely after the outbreak of 
war, feeling personally involved and years later, the adult Brzezinski acknowledged in 
an interview that his interest in international affairs stemmed from that time.  In that 
same interview he spoke of his sadness that ‘Poland was again occupied’ and how 
much he appreciated the freedoms he was allowed to enjoy living in Canada. 
(Zilkowsaka: n.d.) 
 
The Brzezinski family settled in Canada but Zbigniew himself never became a 
Canadian citizen, opting instead to become a citizen of the US later, whilst at Harvard.  
When asked about his identity in later years, he described himself as fashioned by 
‘America, Canada and, to a great extent, Poland’ but went on to say how, when he 
returned to visit Poland after the war, he realised he was ‘no longer a Pole, but an 
American of Polish descent’.  He had embraced his adopted country wholeheartedly 
(Zilkowska: n.d.) and ascribed his loyalty toward it as based on the fact that it was a 
nation that was bound by ideals and not shared experience.  In his mind it was this 
unique condition that made America a superior nation.  (Rosati 1987: 67-8)  However, 
stance was som
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when questioned further about his feelings toward the US he revealingly spoke of how 
 
n 
sistently 
t in the world because its foreign policy was conducted along 
eological lines and Communism, along with fascism and Nazism were to be feared 
 
t 
eal 
he viewed America as a place which could influence world affairs and ultimately help 
Poland. (Zilkowska: n.d.)   
 
Beliefs 
Brzezinski showed throughout his life that he consistently held a very strong central 
pattern of beliefs.  In particular, one overriding belief that he maintained, in Gerry
Andrianopoulus’s opinion, was a vivid ‘enemy’ image of Russia and China.  This 
belief was held in such conviction that it contributed to other related beliefs too.  
(Andrianopolous 1991: 6)  He vigorously held the opinion that the Soviet Union 
maintained ‘an ideology of conflict’ which threatened the international order.  In 
common with Kissinger, one of his greatest concerns was the maintenance of 
international order, and the idea that revolutionary, ideological powers could threate
this was something that worried him deeply.  He viewed the Soviet Union con
as the primary threa
id
because of their goals were ‘the transformation of the international system.’ 
(Andrianopoulos 1991: 39-43)   
 
Brzezinski’s fear of the Soviet Union’s threat to world stability led him base his 
foreign policy approach on the ‘primacy of power’. He advocated militarily strong
solutions to foreign policy problems. (Smith 1986: 36)  His pessimism over the Sovie
Union was longstanding and entrenched well before his arrival in the White House, 
pervading his writing in the 1950s and 1960s.  His scholarly work however, did rev
something of a change of position at the end of the 60s as an interest in the field of 
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technological advancement saw a softening of his stance.  But rather than a change in 
his underlying convictions Jerel Rosati came to the conclusion that this softening was 
actually down to ambition and a desire to be in step with elite opinion.  Rosati 
elieved that he was content to change position for personal advancement when he 
d it necessary and this was something Simon Serfaty had already noted in a 
zezinski 
n people saw him as American as them and publicly 
layed down Polish references as much as he could. 
b
perceive
1978 Foreign Policy article, writing that Brzezinski showed a distinct inclination to 
pick up or drop ideas as they became fashionable. (Serfaty 1978: 6) Finally, Rosati 
noted, once Brzezinski had reached the foreign policy pinnacle of becoming the 
president’s closest advisor, he no longer needed to adjust his approach but could 
revert to his genuinely held central beliefs.  (Rosati 1987: 109)  
 
James Wooten posed the question to Brzezinski, in a 1979 article for Esquire 
magazine, that his hardline attitude toward the Soviets was based on ‘historical 
antipathies between Poles and Russians.’  Whilst he did acknowledge that there may 
have been some truth in the suggestion, he was very keen to point out that, as he 
shared his anti-Communist views with most of the American population, they 
couldn’t have been rooted in his Polish Catholicism. (Wooten 1979: 122)  Br
wanted to make sure the America
p
 
He was keen to deny any differences with the American people because he was 
desperate to remain a powerful figure in Carter’s foreign policy team.  Aware of the 
position and the power he commanded, he set out to maintain the NSA prominence 
that Kissinger had introduced.  In order to do this, it was important to cultivate 
popular support.  He was successful in his goals and his influence over Carter’s 
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foreign policies grew as the term progressed although he constantly competed with 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance over who would have the greatest level of influence.  
 
Carter experienced many problems during his term and many of these were due to th
fact that he lacked a well defined ideology of his own and regularly wavered over his
foreign policy approach.  When he stopped wavering, however, it was most often 
Brzezinski’s advice he took (Smith 1986: 47) something clearly illustrated during th
final and most important foreign policy concern of Carter’s term when the Presid
sided with Brzezinski rather than Vance over the handling of the Iran Hostage Cri
a decision that finally led to Vance’s resignation.  (Rosati 2004: 
e 
 
e 
ent 
sis, 
124)  It is because of 
is high level of influence that the study of what influenced Brzezinski becomes very 
iet 
thing 
ocating right from the beginning 
 far more activist approach toward the Soviets.  Gaddis Smith explained how 
e 
th
relevant.   
 
Brzezinski and Carter  
The appointment of Brzezinski as National Security Advisor unsettled certain Sov
political players because of his quite obvious and extreme anti-Sovietism, some
they attributed, at least in part, to his Polish birth.  They were right to be unsettled 
because Brzezinski did live up to their fears somewhat by showing a dissatisfaction 
with the détente policies of the earlier period and adv
a
Brzezinski saw the Eastern European nations as playing a role in the demise of th
Soviet empire by seeking greater independence and Smith further contends that 
Carter’s official state visit to Poland in December 1977 was a confirmation, albeit a 
tacit one, of Brzezinski’s view. (Smith 1986: 67) 
 
 30
It is highly likely that Brzezinski was responsible for keeping Poland high on the 
president’s agenda.  Poland played a significant part in the overall policies of the 
Carter administration and it was Brzezinski’s input that surely guided that.  In an 
f 
  
rzezinski was obviously very keen for Poland to play an important part in the 
nd one of his first actions was to urge Carter to make his first, 
 
.  
 
s 
 referred to Poland as the ‘linchpin 
attempt to contain and resist Soviet gain, the Carter Administration sought to increase 
détente with countries of Eastern Europe.  But whilst Vance’s angle was to encourage 
equal treatment of all Eastern European countries, Brzezinski advocated a policy o
preferential relationships with those countries considered to be more liberal internally.
Poland was one of these countries and although Carter initially preferred Vance’s 
more equal approach he eventually sided with the more persuasive Brzezinski.  
Consequently, Poland received the advantages that a warm relationship with the US 
could bring. 
 
B
offence against Russia a
symbolically important, official visit to Poland, a suggestion to which Carter agreed. 
(Smith 1986: 238)  However, Brzezinski himself recalled in Power and Principle that
the State Department warned of the implications of this step; it was not without risk
They were worried this would be viewed by the Soviets as provocative and suggested
other Eastern European countries be considered in preference to Poland.  
Nevertheless, the visit to Poland went ahead in spite the worries of Vance’s 
department.   
 
Brzezinski’s strategy was to make Poland part of a larger policy restricting Moscow’
grasp over Eastern Europe.  Gerry Andrianopoulis
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state’ for Brzezinski, describing it as playing a central role in limiting ‘Moscow’s 
control over Eastern Europe.’ (Andrianopoulos 1991: 263-267) 
 
Brzezinski and Vance 
Whilst the Carter Administration was in office, it was apparent that there was a high 
level of dissension within the foreign policy team essentially because of such 
fundamental disagreements between Brzezinski and Vance.  The regular criticism 
levelled at Brzezinski was that, in Gerry Andrianopolous’s words, he contributed ‘
the confusion in national security policy.’ (Andrianopolous 1991: 2)  He was 
generally regarded very much as a ‘hardliner’ in contrast to Vance’s softer stance and 
the fact that C
to 
arter was considered to suffer from indecision on his general policy 
ision only helped to exaggerate the differences as he vacillated from one side or the 
d important 
d 
ight be an explanatory factor in the disagreements at the basis of their 
lationship.   
offensive strategy’ and his absolute adherence to this conviction was fundamental in 
v
other.  
 
Brzezinski was activist and partisan, always keen to act quickly and decisively 
whereas Vance was less rigid and more thoughtful in his policy execution. (Rosati 
1987: 111)  Many scholars, like Jerel Rosati for example, put these difficulties down 
to their ‘divergent world views’, something especially obvious in their perceptions 
regarding the Soviet Union. (Rosati 1987: 20)  Because of this difficult an
relationship it is especially interesting to consider how Brzezinski’s childhoo
experiences m
re
 
One of Brzezinski’s most central beliefs was that the Soviet Union had a ‘grand 
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the disagreement that existed between he and Vance. (Aronoff 2006:  426) Vance 
could not agree with Brzezinski’s stance and later in his own memoirs, blamed many 
f the policy problems the Carter White House experienced on Brzezinski’s ‘visceral 
 1986: 42)  
ecause 
 
 
end the 
s approach, Brzezinski was less optimistic although he was content to align 
imself with Carter’s preferences at the start in order to fit in with the new 
y 
e 
actions to Soviet behaviour, far stronger than his foreign policy 
olleagues advised but his proposals were often adopted because of the sympathetic 
 
o
anti-Sovietism’. (Smith
 
Gaddis Smith contends that Brzezinski was a disruptive member of the team b
he was out of step with the rest of the Carter Administration position right from the
start.  The new president proclaimed that he was going to view the Soviet Union more
optimistically.  He wanted to buck the trend of preceding foreign policies and 
US obsession with anti-Sovietism.  (Rosati 1987: 52)  He believed the Soviet Union 
had only peaceful intentions and was determined to work with them to achieve his 
ambition of eliminating nuclear weapons.  (Smith 1986: 66)  Although Vance agreed 
with thi
h
Administration. (Smith 1986: 7) 
 
It did not take long, however for Brzezinski’s optimism to give way to his more 
natural pessimism.  Rosati believes that Brzezinski’s ‘insecurity and rigid personalit
prompted his return to a previously held image,’ (Rosati 1978: 103-7) this image 
having been formed by his ‘well-developed and largely unchanging views of th
Soviet Union.’  Once this reversion to type took place, time and again, Brzezinski 
urged strong re
c
ear that Carter allowed him.  Carter did not totally accept Brzezinski’s conviction
about a Soviet grand strategy until the later part of his presidency when, after 
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disillusionment with Brezhnev’s actions regarding human rights, he eventually beg
to succumb to his NSA’s constant attempts to press his beliefs home.  Eventually, 
during the course of the term, Carter experienced a dramatic change in his attitude 
toward the Soviets, an occurrence in
an 
 which Brzezinski’s strongly held views and high 
vel of influence were ‘a key factor’ in Yael Aronoff’s view.  Brzezinski’s pessimism 
ti 
at it was a 
ause it was in vogue.  Once established in office, 
articularly after seeing Soviet intervention taking place in Africa in 1978, his intense, 
t 
rter 
d his 
 
 belief 
le
finally managed to drown out Vance’s more optimistic and conciliatory advice.  
(Aronoff 2006: 432-445)   
 
In a speech made to Congress in 1977, Brzezinski claimed that the new administration 
had collectively made the decision to instigate an activist foreign policy which 
rejected the traditional concentration on the containment of the Soviet Union. (Rosa
1987: 43) He claimed that it was he who urged a move away from an ‘over excessive 
preoccupation with the US Soviet relationship’ and called for greater emphasis on 
Third World problems.  (Brzezinski 1985: 148-149)  But Rosati believes th
stance he temporarily adopted bec
p
insecure personality meant he was unable to stop his negative image of the Sovie
Union from resurfacing.  This meant major repercussions for Carter’s foreign policy 
(Rosati 1987: 110) as his deeply held views persuaded an already disillusioned Ca
to bring an end to negotiations with the Soviet Union. (Aronoff 2006: 425)    
 
Soviet intervention in Africa was devastating for Brzezinski because it provoke
deeply held scepticism of the Soviet Union.  Whether consciously or subconsciously,
he associated the African activities with those of military build up in Europe and 
considered them totally incompatible with détente policies and was of the firm
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that the Soviet Union actively pursued dominance in military, economic and 
technological areas.  Brzezinski saw a greater need than Vance to place constraints
the Soviet Union’s expansionism (Rosati 1977: 56-61) and after the intervention in 
Africa, Brzezinski found himself unable to stay in line with the collective position. 
(Rosati 1987: 110) He began to advocate a much stronger national defence policy and 
made global stability through US power his priority.  From then on, he diverged 
significantly from previous
 on 
 Administration stances but eventually managed to 
onvince Carter to go along with his recommendations.   
 of 
 
 
 policy 
any considered to be a failure.  If Carter had been able to predict how Brzezinski’s 
 
c
 
Conclusion 
Brzezinski’s forceful personality and his unbending set of central of beliefs were 
responsible for changing the shape of the foreign policy character of the Carter White 
House.  His strong influence over Jimmy Carter had serious effects on the outcome
US foreign policy.  Yael Aronoff asserts that it was Brzezinski’s influence that pushed
Carter into ‘practically cutting off relations with the Soviet Union’. (Aronoff 2006: 
426)   
 
Such a dramatic outcome leads me to think it might have been a valuable exercise for
Brzezinski’s beliefs to have been analysed and then extrapolated into prediction.  This 
may have resulted in a different outcome for an Administration whose foreign
m
strong views would have been suppressed at first and then allowed to resurface, 
perhaps he would have made a different choice.  Ideological conflict amongst the 
major players resulted in one of the most ineffective foreign policy programmes to
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have come out of the White House and it was Brzezinski’s existing belief syst
contributed to the unstable relationships that existed within the foreign policy team.  
 
 
 
 
em that 
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Madeleine Albright 
 
 
Introduction 
adeleine Albright made headlines by becoming the first woman to hold the position 
f Secretary of State.  But the reason she merits inclusion for this study is that, upon 
her appointment she also became the second foreign-born citizen to hold the role and 
only the third to hold either of the two major foreign policy jobs.  One of the first 
things that becomes clear about Madeleine Albright when considering what 
influenced her is how she differs dramatically from both Kissinger and Brzezinski by 
embracing the fact that her background has shaped her foreign policy thinking.  
Kissinger and Brzezinski have almost zealously tried to deny that their backgrounds 
were influential on their duties yet Albright willingly acknowledges that her 
experiences shaped her and her actions as Secretary of State. 
 
These early experiences were highly influential because Albright, as a child, saw 
oppression from both fascist Germany and Soviet communism.   Consequently, as an 
adult, she performed her duties with ‘her heart on her sleeve, diplomatically speaking’ 
author Thomas Lippman commented, with her decisions being based ‘on her personal 
experiences as a woman, a refugee and a teacher.’ (Lippman 2000: 89)  Biographer 
Michael Dobbs believes that these influences can be traced right back to when 
Albright was just a year old when Hitler made the decision to eliminate her Czech 
homeland.  That event, he argues ‘shaped her foreign policy thinking for the rest of 
her life’. (Dobbs 1999: 34) 
 
M
o
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Childhood 
adeleine Korbel Albright was born Marie Jana Körbel on 15 May 1937 in Prague, 
zechoslovakia, changing Marie to Madeleine at the age of 10.  She took the surname 
on her marriage to Joseph Albright in 1959.  At the time of her birth, 
t 
 he 
is 
g in 
n 
 a letter written decades later, Albright’s mother Mandula recalled the 
afes 
s 
 39-40) 
M
C
of Albright up
Albright herself writes, the Czech population were optimistic because Czechoslovakia 
was able to claim to be the only functioning democracy in Central Europe. But all tha
changed as the Nazi party gained ground in Germany and became a threat to it 
neighbours.  In 1939 her diplomat father discovered that, due to his political links,
was to be arrested by the Gestapo when the German army entered Prague.  H
politically high profile meant that Czechoslovakia was a dangerous place for them to 
be.  Two year old Madeleine and her parents fled the city at night, finally arrivin
London from where her father worked to ‘publicise the facts about Hitler’s occupatio
and to rally fellow Czechoslovaks.’ (Albright 2003: 4-9)  
  
In
circumstances of their exile in 1939.  They spent their last few days in the city in c
and on the streets avoiding arrest and at night they hid in friends’ houses whilst 
waiting for false exit papers to be arranged.  Taking Madeleine, they left 
Czechoslovakia by train at night and fled to Belgrade not realising that they had seen 
their parents for the last time.  Belgrade was similarly dangerous and after two week
the family pressed on to Britain where they settled in London (Blackman 1998:
  
 
 
 
 38
World War II 
 
s had 
 in 
age and Josef explained that 
had been done to make life easier for their children – so their lives would not be 
 whole 
ntil 
gh 
t the end of the war Josef Korbel was part of a group of Czech government officials 
ho took the first plane from London after Czechoslovakia had been liberated. The 
st of the family followed shortly after.  The city they returned to now contained 
 
When World War II broke out, the young Madeleine experienced firsthand the 
bombing raids in London, and in Thomas Blood’s opinion, this was the period when
her world view was formed. (Blood 1999: 173)   
 
Although Albright didn’t come to realise the truth for many decades, the Korbel
also been in danger because of the family’s Jewish heritage.  (Blackman 1998: 38) 
During their exile in London, Madeleine’s three surviving grandparents perished
concentration camps. (Albright 2003: 11)  She was 8 years old when the family 
returned to Prague and from that time on, little or no reference was ever made about 
the relatives who had died during their absence.  It is evident that Madeleine’s parents 
made the conscious decision to cover up their Jewish herit
it 
‘complicated by their Jewishness.’  When Madeleine was 4 years old, the
family converted to Catholicism and from then on she remained a devout Catholic. 
(Blackman 1998: 53-65)  According to her autobiographical writings, it wasn’t u
the time of her appointment as Secretary of State that she discovered throu
newspaper revelations the truth about her grandparents’ death and further 
investigations by the family revealed that many other relatives had died during the 
holocaust – more than a dozen.  (Albright 2003: 235-244)    
 
A
w
re
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large numbers of Russians (Dobbs 1999: 108) and for many Czechoslovaks the 
beration of Prague had been a bittersweet moment.  By allowing the Soviets to be 
 straight into the grip of another and 
e West cared little.  For people like the Korbel family, it was a disaster. (Blackman 
 
f 
hen Madeleine Albright arrived in the US in 1948 at 11 years old, she felt different.  
d 
li
the liberating army, America and the West were accused of abandoning 
Czechoslovakia’s democratic future.  The Czechoslovaks felt betrayed because they 
saw themselves as freed from one totalitarian state
th
1998: 63-64)   
 
Not long after they returned the family was sent on a diplomatic posting to Belgrade
and shortly after, the young Madeleine was sent to school in Switzerland.  The 
Korbels lived a very comfortable life but once again Josef’s political credentials 
meant they began to worry for their safety.  He was a ‘progressive’ and anti-
Communist and became more and more disenchanted as he watched Communism 
gradually taking hold in Belgrade and Prague (Dobbs 1999: 115-6) with the 
democratic parties floundering. (Albright 2003: 12)  When eventually the 
Communists gained enough power to take over the Czech government in 1948, Jose
was removed from his post and temporarily assigned to UN duties in Kashmir where 
he decided to use his UN links to help them to flee once and for all to the US. 
(Blackman 1998: 70 and 80) 
 
Becoming American 
W
Despite speaking 4 languages, including English, she noticed most of all that she 
didn’t speak ‘American’.  She consciously lost the British accent with which she 
spoke English (Albright 2003: 18; Blackman 1998: 94) and immediately determine
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to transform herself into ‘a model American’.  The transformation process that b
in that first American school saw its culmination in her rising to the highest position
in the US government attainable by a first-generation immigrant (Dobbs 
 
In 1957, whilst a student at Wellesley College she became an American citizen 
(Albright 2003: 35) and though she fully embraced life as an American she 
nevertheless rem
egan 
 
1999: 6)   
ained closely attached to her homeland and always remembered the 
aumas she had witnessed.  Writing in her memoir, she said ‘as much as I wanted to 
  
d been 
een 
 in a 
y, from 
 her to 
this chapter has been more about Josef Korbel than his 
aughter but this is not an oversight.  It is extremely apparent from reading Albright’s 
he greatest influences on her foreign policy approach was her 
16)  
rents 
tr
be like my American contemporaries, I was not.  I had spent nights in a bomb shelter.
I had felt in my own life some of the disruption war could cause.  My family ha
driven from its homeland by the admirers of Stalin.’ (Albright 2003: 43) Having b
persecuted for her heritage, like Brzezinski she now believed wholeheartedly
nation where values were the glue that bound it together, not nationality (Albright 
2003: 249) The years that Albright’s family spent moving, mostly unwillingl
country to country left a profound and long lasting effect on her and caused
comment in later life on how she viewed those experiences as symbolic and 
representative of ‘the turbulence of the twentieth century’. (Blood 1999: 173)   
 
It may seem at first sight that 
d
memoirs that one of t
father. (Albright 2003: xiii) Those who have written about Madeleine agree that it is 
impossible to understand her without understanding her father.  (Blackman 1998: 
Perhaps because of her itinerant early life, Albright was extremely close to her pa
and her father in particular, a man of strong political convictions, was hugely 
 41
influential.  She modelled herself on him becoming, in the words of her sister, ‘Daddy
reincarnate.’ (Dobbs 1999: 141)   
 
 
osef drummed into his daughter the belief that ‘Communists could not be trusted, 
error of 
 
 
ew 
 the 1938 
he and her father would always ‘look at the world through the prism of the Munich 
 
 
J
because they did not desire co-existence, they desired conquest.’  This and the 
experience of watching from afar as Czechoslovakia was taken over by the t
Stalin’s communism (Albright 2003: 26) combined to make the Cold War a vivid 
experience for the young Albright.  She saw it as, in her words, an era of ‘stark, moral
clarity.  We were good, the Communists were bad.’ (Albright 2003: 43-44) 
 
Munich 
The other significant belief that Albright acquired from her father was a vivid 
interpretation of the events of Munich.  The Munich analogy was a consistent and 
highly evident factor in the decisions Albright made.  Admitting readily how many of
her fathers thoughts were mirrored in her own, she acknowledged in a radio intervi
that one of the most profound things she learnt from him was how disastrous
Munich negotiations were for Czechoslovakia.  (All Things Considered 2006)  Both 
s
disaster.’ The negotiations, which led to the ceding of the Czech Sudetenland, became 
forever more the symbol of appeasement and, in Ann Blackman’s words 
‘synonymous with diplomatic cowardice.’ (Blackman 1998: 37)  Through the Czech
experience, both came to believe that it was the US and the West’s obligation to stand
up to aggression.  (Albright 2003: 27) 
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According to William Hyland, Munich was a preoccupation that saw Albright 
instigate a policy basis of ‘collective security’ which in turn led to ‘an inordinate 
liance of the United Nations.’ (Hyland 1999: 21-22)  Even Albright thought she 
a 
 to 
 
e saw 
 
sure that her 
 
elieved the problems of countries far away 
ere not the US’s responsibility.  She gained a reputation amongst her colleagues for 
being, in Lippman’s words, rather ‘trigger happy’, something perhaps illustrated when 
re
brought a completely different stance compared to other foreign policy makers.  In 
New York Times in 1996, interview she proffered this highly personal comment
explain the decisions she had made during the Bosnian war.  ‘My mindset is Munich;
most of my generation’s is Vietnam….. I saw what happened when a dictator was 
allowed to take over a piece of a country and the country went down the tubes.’ 
(Sciolino 1996: 67)   
 
America 
When Albright was appointed Secretary of State she made it quite clear that sh
America’s role as one which should actively involve itself on the world stage.  She
had seen firsthand how the entrance of America into the Second World War brought 
the hope of security and this prompted her to forever think of the US as ‘the 
indispensable nation’. (Blood 1999: 8)  Her view, at its most basic, was constructed 
around the belief in America’s position of moral superiority over the Soviet Union. 
(Albright 2006: 87)   
 
The result of her passionate stance on the triumph of democracy was to en
time as Secretary of State would be spent making America as activist as possible.  She
determined to get the US involved wherever she saw oppression and aggression.  But 
this brought criticism from many who b
w
 43
Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, recounted an exchang
which she famously remarked ‘What’s the point of having this superb military tha
you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’ leading to Powell’s equally famous
reflection over concern for his troops ‘I thought I would have an aneurysm’.  (Powell 
1995: 576)   
 
But despite being aware of her many critics, Elaine Sciolino, in her 1996 article 
portrayed Albright as unperturbed and completely at ease with the powerful imag
with which she charac
e in 
t 
 
e 
terised American foreign policy.  According to Sciolino, her 
onfidence in its moral basis was directly attributable to her refugee experiences. 
1996)  Albright was, quite simply, an idealist not a realist and had no trouble 
 most 
 358) She appeared to feel personally the genocide and 
ersecution that was taking place and this coloured her approach.  In consequence, 
se 
c
(Sciolino 
defending her style. 
 
The Balkans 
It is in the analysis of the Bosnian War that Albright’s background is perhaps
clearly seen because the crisis was something personal and visceral for her, directly 
related to her own family’s experiences during and after World War II according to 
Dobbs.  (Dobbs 1999:
p
hers was the loudest voice amongst the calls being heard for strong US involvement.  
(Blood 1999: 173)   
 
Richard Immerman was more specific when he wrote that it was impossible to analy
her calls for the use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo without considering the 
importance of Munich on Albright’s family.  (Immerman 2004: 106)  She clearly saw 
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a direct link between the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the Munich appeasement of
1938 and as a result urged the US not to allow what she saw as the abandonment of 
the Bosnians to the Serb army.  This was in distinct contrast to other high profile 
decision makers (Dobbs 1999: 41) as not only were many European foreign ministers 
advocating m
 
inimal action on either side of the conflict but many in her own 
overnment were too.  Upon learning of the Srebrenica massacre where 8,000 died, 
t the 
, 
he personality and the effects of Madeleine Albright’s own firsthand experiences 
t effects on all of her decision making processes, a condition she was 
 
w 
nce on her work.  In contrast to Kissinger, she was convinced 
er unique life story helped to qualify her for the role of statesman not preclude her 
g
Albright found herself distraught at the idea the ethnic cleansing that took place a
hands of the Nazis could ever happen again.  Force was the only thing, she believed
that could make the Serbs stop and she was in no doubt whatsoever that it was US 
responsibility to provide this force. (Dobbs 1999: 358-360)   
 
Conclusion 
T
had significan
only too ready to admit.  The events she had witnessed were not something she tried
to forget nor did she try to deny the fact that these events had repercussions 
throughout her adult life.  Rather she saw them as something that informed her 
positions for the better, something that could be used to be able to interpret ho
America could best solve the problems of the world.  Unlike Brzezinski and 
Kissinger, she was happy to acknowledge publicly that she believed her experiences 
were a positive influe
h
from it. 
 
 45
She was very proud to be part of ‘the indispensable nation’ and she was especially 
proud to be able to contribute to the direction of its actions towards the rest of the 
world.  Although her experiences were dramatic for her family, she saw the result
those experiences as something to be used for the good of the world.  She vigorously 
seized the opportunity that being Secretary of State allowed her to take those p
events and use them to inform her decisions in a constructive and activist way. 
 
 
s of 
ersonal 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
By analysing the effects of background on this exclusive group of three, this research, 
I believe, has shown that their émigré experiences did had an effect, at least to some 
extent, on US foreign policy during their terms in office.  The magnitude of their 
experiences inevitably filtered down to their actions whilst in office.  However, what 
was also revealed was that their similarly dramatic experiences did not necessarily 
lead to similar foreign policy approaches.   
 
One of the biggest differences shown between Kissinger, Brzezinski and Albright 
when considering the question of childhood influences was the fact only Albright was 
willing to completely acknowledge that events in the past had an effect on her actions 
as policymakers.  Both Kissinger and Brzezinski seemed distinctly unwilling to admit 
to such an effect yet both, when pressed, would concede that there were instances 
where influence might be seen. 
 
When it comes to their policy approaches, Kissinger and Brzezinski, in spite of being 
members of opposing party administrations, did share the belief that international 
stability was paramount although they differed quite radically on how that stability 
should be achieved.  Whereas Brzezinski envisaged stability controlled by US 
dominance, Kissinger believed it could only be achieved through superpower balance. 
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One factor that did seem to be share ree is that they each displayed a 
keenness to assimilate.  All showed, to a greater or lesser degree, a loyalty and 
affection to the country of their birth but ev
America.  They may have professed to having various identities but the identity they 
adhered to most strongly was that of being American, an identity based on values not 
heritage. 
 
When trying to summarise the extent to which background influences have affected 
US foreign policy, it is important to consider the reality that policymakers don’t make 
decisions in isolation; they are one part of a large and unwieldy system of bureaucracy 
that can severely constrain the effects of decision and the analyst should be wary of 
attributing too much weight to the influence of personality over final foreign policy 
outcomes.  Despite their elevated status, Albright, Brzezinski and Kissinger were still 
required to operate within the bureaucratic and presidential systems of the 
Administrations they served.  The influence of the NSA or the Secretary of State’s 
cognitive approach will always be tempered by the president’s own decisions.  
However significantly the nature of the regimes they lived under impacted on their 
later lives, the character of both the president himself and the administration 
inevitably curtail their effects. However it should not be forgotten that there were 
certainly periods when the president has been less engaged in the processes and the 
next most important person has had greater influence.  When the Watergate events 
were taking place, for example, Kissinger was permitted more influence over foreign 
policy simply because Nixon was distracted.  I think it could also be assumed that 
Albright would have had freer rein when Clinton’s impeachment process was 
underway too.  
d amongst all th
en greater than that was their loyalty to 
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 This research has prompted me to conclude that the studying of policymakers an
their most central patterns of belief is highly relevant because of its potential for 
prediction.  If the beliefs of foreign policy elites can be analysed, then some 
prediction is perhaps possible. (Rosati 1987: 174)  For this prediction to achieve a 
level of re
d 
liability certain things must be considered such as how stable are the beliefs 
r are there severely contradictory beliefs held amongst the main players in the 
eign 
o
foreign policy team.  Once the beliefs are summarised perhaps the next most 
important question to be asked is do the beliefs represent what is expected from the 
electorate?   
 
I would contend that the aim of achieving insight into the individual player is not an 
end in itself but rather should be a tool to improve the policymaking system.  The role 
of the elite individual is important in the execution of good constructive for
relations.  Surely it should be as important to subject these individuals to close 
analysis as it is for institutional, organisational or ideological role analysis. 
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